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  11. Introduction 
 
The greying of society has become a catchphrase for the demographic transformation 
of Western societies: The share of elderly in the population is increasing. The elderly 
demand better old-age care and more health care services and represent a pressure for 
higher public sector spending in these areas. The spending demands of the elderly can 
crowd out educational spending. Several studies of US states analyze the negative 
correlation between the share of elderly and educational spending, notably Poterba 
(1997, 1998), Fernandez and Rogerson (1997) and Ladd and Murray (2001). The 
negative effect of the growing share of elderly for the spending in education is 
confirmed in European studies including Borge and Rattsø (1995) for Norway, Borge 
and Rattsø (2007) for Denmark, and Grob and Wolter (2005) and Cattaneo and 
Wolter (2008) for Switzerland.  
 
We extend this literature to take into account altruism within the family using unique 
data about family relations within local governments in Norway. Altruism within the 
family means that individuals care about the welfare of family members. The 
conflicting claims to the public budget cannot be seen as a competition between age 
groups alone. We take into account whether middle-aged have children or elderly 
parents in the community. While it is true that elderly account for a larger share of the 
voting population, number of parents and grandparents per child has increased as 
well.
1 This could imply more voting power per child. At the same time, people care 
for their elderly parents in need for nursing services. This could induce higher levels 
of public spending demand for old-related services among middle-aged persons.  
 
Altruism within the family has primarily been investigated related to transfers 
between individuals, as discussed recently by McGerry (2000, NBER). We relate 
altruism to the political priority of services among age groups. The politics of altruism 
within the family has been investigated by Stromberg (1998) in an analysis of local 
government spending in Sweden. He shows that the benefit share of the median voter 
correcting for family age composition influences the spending pattern, and when old 
raise the benefit share the relative spending of old-age services goes up. While 
                                                 
1 In Norway, number of persons per family has decreased from 2,54 in 1960 to 2,19 in 2006 (Statistics 
Norway). Most of the reduction is due to fewer children in each family. 
  2Stromberg corrects benefit shares based on national age distributions, we observe 
family links in each local government.  
 
We do not restrict the empirical specification to a specific political economy model, 
but motivate our approach in a swing voter framework. The basic framework includes 
a demand model of local public services with generational conflict and disadvantage 
of being part of a large cohort (user group). The generational conflict follows from 
different demand for local services among different age groups. The cost effect of a 
large cohort shows up in the budget constraint, the costs are high when a fixed service 
level is offered to many clients like the elderly. Our extension takes into account that 
an age group can take into account the service demands of family members in other 
age groups (children and parents).  
 
In the Norwegian setting we are able to analyze the age composition of voters and 
public services to old and young simultaneously. Local governments provide the 
relevant services directly related to specific age groups of the population. First we 
study the importance of family altruism for the desired priority of local services using 
survey data. The interviews ask a sample of the population about their priority of 
spending to child care, schools, and care for the elderly. The desired spending is 
clearly related to the age of the respondent, the young want more spending for child 
care and schools while the old want more spending for care for the elderly. The 
desired allocation of local government funds reflects generational conflict. Family 
altruism is shown to be important for child care and schools, but not for old-age care. 
 
The actual importance of family altruism is tested using demographic and local 
government budget data for 1992-2004. The estimates indicate that altruism is 
important to understand the relationship between age groups and educational 
spending. Parents help defend spending in schools, while the cost disadvantage of 
large cohorts tend to reduce educational spending per pupil in child care and primary 
education. Both micro- and macro-data suggest that allocations for old-age care are 
not affected by family altruism. The elderly voters must rely on their own political 
influence.   
 
  3Theoretical motivation is developed in section 2, a swing-voter model that allows for 
altruism between generations. Empirical research design is outlined in section 3. 
Section 4 presents the results regarding desired allocation and family altruism.  The 
econometric analysis of actual allocation is presented in section 5. Concluding 
remarks are offered in section 6. 
 
2. A politico-economic model of age-related policy-making 
 
The standard median-voter model based on self-interested voters can hardly explain 
the generational conflict over public services. Competing political parties adjust 
policies to the preferences of the median voter, and the large middle-income and 
middle-aged generations are expected to include the median. A more advanced 
approach assumes models of overlapping generations where political parties offer 
citizens a policy package comprising taxes on the young and middle-aged cohorts, 
which are used to finance pensions for the elderly (Browning 1975; for review, see 
Breyer 1994; Persson and Tabellini 2000). Yet it is hard to believe that governments 
can make credible commitments for generations to come, particularly for public 
services that have much weaker legal protection than pensions. It seems more realistic 
to assume that current policies have modest bearing on future policies, and that 
today’s young and middle-aged will have to fight their own political battle once they 
retire.  
 
We make two basic assumptions in our outline of a model to understand the politics of 
demographics. First, we open up for the possibility that voters are altruistic within the 
family. They cast their vote with consideration for their own children and 
grandchildren as well as for elderly parents (Strömberg 2006). Second, we employ a 
probabilistic voting model rather than a median-voter model. Swing-voter models 
suggest that relatively small groups of voters can be attractive prey for competing 
political parties (Lindbeck and Weibull 1987; Dixit and Londregan 1996).  
 
Model assumptions 
The economy consists of three groups, children (C), middle-aged people (M), and 
elderly persons (E). Local government provides two types of services, i.e. primary 
  4education for children and old-age care for elderly. Middle-aged persons do not 
consume public services. Each child consumes an amount of CC of schooling, and 
each elderly consume CE of old-age care services. The utility function for children is 





Total population of the (local) government is , and the unit costs of 
providing services for children and elderly are
CM NN N N =++
and  E p p respectively. With an 
exogenous amount of local government revenue R (which is a good description of 
Norwegian local governments), government’s budget constraint becomes: 
 
(1)  EE E CCC p CN pCN R +=   Government’s budget constraint 
 
Optimum allocation with an altruistic social planner 
The social planner (P) maximizes the social welfare function 
 
(2)  () () P CC E E UN V CN W C =+  Welfare  function 
 











=  Welfare  optimum 
 
A higher share of elderly increases the costs of providing services for the elderly, 
which is exactly counteracted, as number of elderly and children are weights in the 
welfare function.  The welfare optimum (5) is a normative benchmark. Changes in the 
age composition of local authorities should have no impact on resource allocation. 
 
The preferred allocations of a middle-aged versus an elderly citizen 
We are interested in comparing the desired allocations of middle-aged and elderly 
citizens. Consider the situation of a middle-aged citizen i with altruistic preferences. 
He may or may not have children that consume education services, here represented 
by the binary variable . He may have parents who live in the municipality and  0,1
C
i n =
  5consume old-age care services measured by the binary variable  . Let  0,1
E
i n =
0 γ ≥ measure the extent to which a middle-aged person values the welfare of his 
children, and  0 ε ≥  measures the degree of altruism towards his parents. The utility 
functions for the middle-aged can we written: 
 
(3) ( ) ( )
CE
M iC i Un V Cn W C γε =+ E  Utility of middle-aged citizen (M) 
 
Similarly, suppose an elderly voter j may have grandchildren in the municipality, 
binary variable  , and let the degree of altruism towards the grandchildren be 




0 λ ≥ . The utility of elderly may therefore be written: 
 
(4)    Utility of elderly citizen (E)  () ()
C
Ej C E Um V CW C λ =+
 
Inserting the budget constraint in (1) and (2) yields reduced form utility functions for 
middle-aged and elderly, that is  
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=   Optimum allocation for an elderly voter (E) 
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   Optimum allocation for the middle-aged voter  
(10) 
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   Optimum allocation for elderly voter  
 
An elderly citizen j will prefer a higher allocation to elderly than a middle-aged 










> . This is likely when  = 0 
(no grandchildren in community), λ is small (not much altruism towards 
grandchildren when there),  = 0 (middle aged has no parents in community), ε is 
small (not much altruism towards parents when there),  = 1 (middle aged has 







γ is large (middle aged care much about children 
welfare). 
 
The swing-voter equilibrium 
The swing-voter model assumes that citizens support the party that offers the highest 
level of individual welfare. Voter welfare increases with levels of consumption and 
closeness to parties’ ideological position. Political parties have fixed ideological 
positions, and party ideology has no bearing on the use of policy instruments. The mix 
of public services to children versus elderly is used to maximize voter support.  
 
The polity consists of two political parties, Left (L) and Right (R). Following the 
notation of Persson and Tabellini (2000), let  , and , M iE j X X be individual specific 
parameters that capture voters propensity to support party L. A middle-aged voter i 
  7will vote for the Left party if   , () ()
LR
M EM E M UC UC X −> i
j
.
2 Similarly, an elderly voter j 
will vote for the Left party if . For each set of policy offers, 
one particular voter in each of the two groups (middle-aged and elderly) is indifferent 
between the two political parties. We define cut-off values 
, () ()
LR
EE EE E UC UC X −>
Mi X and  Ej X for these 
voters:  
 
(12)  , () ()
LR
M EM E M UC UC X −= i
j
 
(13)    , () ()
LR
EE EE E UC UC X −=
 
Cumulative distribution functions for  , M i X and  , Ej X are described by  () M Mi X Φ  
and ( ) EE j X Φ . For a given set of policy offers, a fraction  () M Mi X Φ of middle-aged 
citizens support party L, and a fraction  ( ) EE j X Φ of elderly citizens vote for party L. 
All citizens are assumed to cast their votes. The corresponding cut-point densities are 
written 





∂Φ Φ= ∂ and similarly for 
'
E Φ . If the density (
' ,
'
M E Φ Φ ) is low, 
voters are ideologically divided.  
 
Since local governments consist of one election district, and local councils are elected 
by proportional representation, we assume that each party maximizes its vote share. 

















Let  denote the total share of votes in favor of the Left party (L), and  the 
corresponding share of the Right party (R). In a system of proportional representation, 
we may write the share of seats going to the L-party: 
L S R S
 
                                                 
2 The model assumes no abstentions. However, elderly citizens have considerably higher rates of 
voting participation than the young. For example, about 75 percent of people below 50 years report that 
they vote, while nearly 90 percent of those above 50 years say that they participated.  
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Party L maximizes its vote share using services to elderly as policy instrument ( ), 
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In equilibrium, party R yields an identical policy offers. An increase in per capita 
services to elderly leads to an increase in electoral support among elderly that are 
equal to the loss of support among middle-aged votes.  
 
Interpretation of swing-voter equilibrium 
This equilibrium outcome allows us to discuss the comparative static related to 
politico-economic factors: demographics, number of middle-aged and elderly voters, 
family structures and altruism, and ideological homogeneity of the two voter groups. 
 
a)  Demographics: The first ratio in (16) captures the costs of demographic 





, which leads 
to a lower level of old-age care relative to education services. The shift could 






) may increase without shifting the number elderly voters relative 
middle-aged voters. 
  9b)  Numerical voting strength: A larger elderly population obviously means a 













 voters, which in 
turn makes elderly more attractive political prey. If middle-aged voters only 











. The cost effect of a larger elderly population can be 
cancelled out by the greater increase political weight of elderly voters.  
c)  Family altruism: Altruism affects the swing-voter equilibrium, depending on 
number of middle-aged voters who have elderly parents, number of middle-
aged voters with own children, and number of elderly voters who are 
grandparents. To see how this works, suppose elderly voters are ideologically 
heterogeneous, so that parties’ policy offers have no effect on their voting 
behavior: . Now the political component reduces to 









. The political 
parties compete for votes among the middle aged only. This is Strömberg’s 
(2006) median-voter equilibrium. Altruism towards elderly versus children 







i , demographics falls out the 







i , the allocation is biased in favor of the 
elderly, and vice versa.  
d)  Swing voting: It requires a relatively large shift in public policy to “swing” an 
extreme left-wing voter to support a right-wing party, and vice versa. Vote-
maximizing parties are therefore likely to lean policies in favor of 
ideologically homogenous voter groups that are “cheap to buy”. From a life-
cycle perspective, it has been argued that elderly voters are more homogenous 
than middle-aged since ideological cleavages on the labour market are less 
relevant. From a generational perspective, we should expect elderly to be more 
ideologically divided than young people. Many elderly grew up a polarized 
political environment in the 1930s and 1940s. This has made a lasting 
  10ideological impression on this generation. Survey data support this conjecture: 
Elderly people are more ideologically polarized than young people. For 
example, ideological dispersion can be measured by the standard deviation of 
the left-right self-placement scale. In Norway, the standard deviation is highest 
for people aged 67 years or more, lower for people aged 50-66 years, and 
lowest for the younger cohorts. Moreover, younger voters have lower party 
identification than elderly people, and they are much more likely than elderly 
citizens to shift party between elections. In terms of the swing-voter model, it 
appears to be cheaper to swing a young than an elderly voter.
3  
 
To simplify interpretation, suppose elderly care for themselves while middle-
aged voter only care for their children. This could be due to mobility from 
rural to urban districts. Grandparents continue live in peripheral 
municipalities, while their middle-aged children and their grandchildren have 
moved to more centrally located areas. Hence, elderly cast their vote out of 
concern for old-age care, while middle-aged voters cater for their children’s 










. A higher share 
of elderly voters relative to middle-aged voters, when elderly are more 
ideologically homogenous than middle-aged voters, and less middle-aged 
altruism towards own children yields relatively more supply of old-age care.  
 
 
3. Research design  
 
The analysis addresses both desired allocation using interview data and actual 
allocation using local government data. Three interviews are made by Statistics 
Norway during 1993, 1996 and 2007. The interviews cover the use of local services 
                                                 
3 That young people have more political clout than elderly is also demonstrated in a survey 
questionnaire to local council members in Norway (2003). Elected politicians were asked whether their 
political party had attempted to gain electoral support among particular occupational groups, age 
groups or groups with different income levels. Nearly all representatives denied that their party targeted 
particular groups, except age groups. About 30 percent of the local council members stated that their 
party tried to gain more support from young voters. Like in marketing campaigns, it appears more 
profitable to target generous policies towards the young customer-voter. 
 
  11by each household and what services are desired. The surveys capture family altruism 
since the respondent must state what members of the household or in near family 
make use of the local services.  
 
The analysis of actual allocation covers 434 local governments (municipalities). Child 
care, primary and lower secondary education, health care and care for the elderly are 
heavy items in their budgets. These services are publicly provided private goods 
directed towards specific subgroups of the population. The relevant ‘client’ group for 
child care is children aged 0-5 years and for primary and lower secondary education 
children aged 6-15 years.
4 Health care and care for the elderly cover a broader set of 
the population, but the share of the elderly 80 years and above represent the main 
target group. About 50 percent of people aged 80 years of more receive nursing 
services from their municipality. Most who receive services get assistance in their 
homes, while a modest share of the elderly live in nursing homes
5 (Statistics Norway 
2005).  
 
The size and development of spending per ‘client’ are displayed in Table 1. To 
concentrate on the local political battle of economic priority we work with net current 
spending, gross spending with deductions for fees from the users and matching grants 
from the central government. 
 
All three categories of spending per client show strong growth during the period 1992 
to 2000 (in nominal terms), while increased fees and matching grants have held back 
growth in the last part of the period (2000-2004). In particular this has been a period 
of expansion of child care. Spending per client in primary school, old care and health 
care have developed in tandem. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
During the period under study the local governments have experienced quite different 
demographic transitions. Typically the share of young families has been strongly 
increasing in urban areas, while the share of elderly has been strongly increasing in 
                                                 
4 Primary schooling was extended to 6-year olds in 1996.  
5 About 7-8 percent of those aged 80 years or more live in nursing homes.  
  12the periphery. On average the share of elderly shows the most consistent pattern, an 
increase by nearly 20%, from an average share of 4,4% to 5,4%. The numbers are 
reported in Table 1. 
 
Regulated income taxes and block grants represent more than 80% of total revenue on 
average. The rest is filled up by fees and regulated property taxes. All local 
governments use the maximum income tax rate and we treat the sum of regulated 
income taxes and block grants as local government revenue given from the central 
government. It should be noticed that the block grants are calculated based on 
objective criteria that measures the economic and demographic situation in the local 
government. The block grants are partly tax equalization based on tax bases and partly 
expenditure equalization based on need indicators.  
 
The analysis is based on a balanced panel data set covering all Norwegian local 
governments during the period 1992-2004. The data are collected from local 
government accounts and population statistics. The econometric model is formulated 
to capture the role of demographic variables spelled out in section 2. The starting 
point is a demand model of local public services and the key demand variable is local 
government revenue supplied by the central government. Borge and Rattsø (1995) and 
Borge et al. (1995) discuss and apply the demand model. The dependent variable 
( ) is net current spending per client in three local public services: child care, 
primary/lower secondary education, and care for the elderly (health care in 
community i in year t. The following benchmark empirical specification is applied for 






log( ) log( ) log( ) log( 0 6 ) log( 7 15 )
log( 67 79 ) log( 80 ) log( ) log( 0 6 )
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+− + + +
−
                   (1) 
 
The explanatory variables are per capita revenue (regulated income taxes and grants) 
( it REV ), the share of children 0-6 years of age ( 06 it CH − ), the share of children 7-15 
years of age ( 71 5 it CH − ), the share of elderly 67-79 years of age  ( ),  the  67 79it EL −
  13share of the population 80 years and above ( 80 it EL + ), the share of the population 
with parents in the community  ( ), the share of the population with 
children 0-6 years in the community  (
it PARENTS
06 it CHILDREN − ), the share of the population 
with children 7-15 years in the community  ( 71 5 it CHILDREN − ), and the share of the 
population with higher education  ( ). A set of time dummies ( it HIGHEREDU t α ) 
capture time specific factors common to all local governments, and  it ε  is an error 
term. All equations have been estimated with standard random effects and fixed 
effects models.  
 
The main methodological challenge is the importance of mobility. If the client groups 
move from local governments with low spending per client to local governments with 
high spending per client, population shares and spending per client are jointly 
determined, and Tiebout-bias is a potential problem. The Tiebout-effect produces a 
positive correlation between the relative size of the client group and spending per 
client in their own sector, and the true direct effect is likely to be underestimated (in 
absolute value) when the simultaneity problem is not taken into account. The potential 
Tiebout-bias is handled by use of instruments. We follow Borge and Rattsø (2007), 
Harris et al. (2001) and Ladd and Murray (2001), and use historical measures of the 
age composition as instruments. We apply data for the age distribution across local 





4. Spending preferences of young, middle-aged and elderly citizens 
 
It has been argued that old age and retirement in itself makes elderly more “single-
minded” as they only care about own interests in redistributive politics (Profeta 2002; 
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin 2003). This is obviously an empirical issue. It would 
depend on the person’s family situation and degrees of altruism towards own children, 
grandchildren and elderly parents. We use data from three surveys to throw light on 
desired services by different age groups, and the interviews are made by Statistics 
                                                 
6 For both years, instrument variables include population shares in the age groups 0-5 years, 5-15 years, 
67-79 years, 80 years and more plus total population. 
  14Norway in 1993, 1996 and 2007.
7 Comparable surveys are done by Brunner and 
Balsdon (2004) and Duncombe et al. (2003). 
 
The desired local services by age group are displayed in Table 2. The interviews cover 
the use of three local government services: child care for children 0-5 years of age, 
primary schooling for pupils aged 6-15 years of age, and care for the elderly. In the 
1993 and 1996 surveys, respondents reported whether he/she or anyone in the 
household had used particular services during the last two years. In the 2007 survey, 
respondents answered a slightly different question. They stated whether he/she or 
anyone in close family had used particular services during the last two years. We have 
classified responses according to respondent’s own age.  
 
In 1993 and 1996, about 13 percent stated that people in the household used child 
care, 23 percent reported that household members went to a primary school, and 3 
percent responded that household members used old-age care. As to be expected, 
young people had household members consuming child care and schooling services, 
while elderly respondents were more likely to use services for the elderly. The 2007 
question includes ‘close’ family members residing outside the respondent’s 
household. The resulting usage rates are higher in the 2007 survey, and age-group 
differences are much smaller than in the 1993 and 1996 surveys.   
 
These data allow us to explore family altruism as a phenomenon limited to household 
members (usually children) or extending to close family outside the household 
(including elderly parents and/or children living with their divorced mother). Note 
that three of four children (- 18 years of age) live with both parents. About 32 percent 
of those children who live with one parent also live with a stepfather or stepmother as 
well (Statistics Norway 2007).  
 
To the extent that family altruism is important, we would not expect to observe large 
differences in public spending priorities between different age-groups. For example, 
                                                 
7 The three surveys have been conducted by Statistics Norway, which can provide further 
documentation for the datasets. Datasets are available through the Norwegian Social Science Data 
Services (NSD). The 1993 and 1996 surveys were called “Peoples relationship through local 
government”, and the 2007 survey was part on the local election survey program. 
 
  15Rhodebeck (1993) presents survey data pertaining to American voters preferences for 
health care spending and social security. She shows that the responses of elderly are 
not always consistent with their age-related interests.  
 
The spending priorities of the respondents are presented in Table 2. Respondents were 
asked to state how they would like to allocate 1000 Kroner among different local 
government service responsibilities. The survey question was identical in all years. 
The table displays the average allocation in Norwegian Kroner for three age-related 
local services, child care, schooling, and old-age care. (Respondents were allowed to 
allocate money for some other local government services, which includes 
infrastructure services.) 
 
Care for the elderly ranks highest in all age groups, education spending is number 
two, and child care ranks lowest. Respondents prefer significant increases in the 
allocations for all three services, which imply that smaller spending increases for 
services like infrastructure and culture in 2007. People want to expand the welfare 
sector. Moreover, priority setting is related to respondent’s own age. Young people 
want higher spending for child care and education, and elderly citizens want 
significantly higher spending on old-age care.
8 Yet people aged less than 50 years of 
age want to increase spending for the elderly more that spending for child care or 
schooling. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Increased spending towards the elderly to cover their pensions, health care and public 
nursing services will put a pressure on public budgets and may motivate increased 
taxes. Many elderly are quite wealthy, partly as a result of generous public pensions 
and partly due to significant increases in the value of their homes. (Norwegians 
usually own their housing.) We asked whether the respondent would be willing to pay 
1000 Kroner in higher taxes to finance better services in areas where the individual 
                                                 
8Data from the Norwegian Election Studies (i.e. parliamentary elections) allows another approach to 
measuring policy preferences. Respondents are asked to state one or two issues that are important for 
their party choice. In an analysis of the correlation of the responses and voters’ age it has been shown 
that pensions, old age care and health services are more important for elderly than young people.  
 
  16believes the extra money are most needed. Most people say that they are willing to 
pay higher taxes: 60 percent in 1993, 64 percent in 1996 and 59 percent in 2007. 
However, elderly citizens are less willing to pay higher taxes than are younger voters. 
Elderly voters believe that young voters should pay for better old-age care, while 
young voters accept higher taxes to finance better services.
9
 
To test family altruism, we display regression analyses with the desired public 
spending allocation as response variable (log scale), and respondent’s age and family 
usage of the relevant services as explanatory variables. A similar regression has 
acceptance for higher local tax rates as response variable. We present two types of 
regressions; the first (I) estimates an overall effect of service usage, while the second 
(II) apply interaction terms to identify the impact of altruism in the household (1993, 
1996) and in close family (2007). Demography, revenues and actual service provision 
differs between local authorities, so the desired allocation could be expected to be 
influenced by the community-specific factors. The regressions include local 
government fixed effects. The results are presented in table 3. 
 
Family altruism first and for all is important for child care. The family use of child 
care clearly increases the desired spending to child care. The estimates (I) suggest that 
a respondent who rely on child care services wants to allocate about three times more 
resources to child care services relative to a respondent who does not use any of the 
three local government services. In model II, we explore the difference between 
household altruism and close family altruism. The positive interaction term suggests 
that household altruism raises desired spending levels considerably more than near 
family altruism.  For school services, we observe a similar pattern. Respondents who 
rely on education services want bigger increases in school spending than others 
(model I). We estimate an impact when close family members attend primary schools, 
and a significantly larger impact when household members use school services (model 
II).  
                                                 
9 These results challenge the findings of Boeri, Börsch-Supan and Tabellini (2001). They employ 
survey data to study how voters in France, Germany, Italy and Spain assess the size of the welfare 
state. A massive majority supports the status quo. About two-thirds of those who want change would 
like to reduce taxes and spending, while one-third would like to increase the welfare state. Young 
people are less supportive of increasing the welfare state than middle-aged, while the elderly are more 
sympathetic to tax and spending increases (table 13). 
 
  17Table 3 about here 
 
The situation is different for old-age care. The respondents’ age is obviously 
important: Those who are less than 50 years of age want about 1/5 of the spending 
level relative to those who are 67 years of age or more (model I). Whether household 
members or family members rely on nursing services have little bearing on 
respondents spending priorities. Both model I and II indicate usage of services have 
no significant impact on the desired allocation for old-age care. Family altruism is 
important for the demand for child care and primary education services, but is 
negligible for old-age care. 
 
The age of the respondent is important for the demand of all services. This is true in 
particular for kindergartens, where a young person (under 50 years of age) prefers to 
allocate about four times as much money compared to an elderly person (more than 
67 years of age). Respondents’ age appears to play a similar role in the school and 
old-age care sectors.  
 
The final regressions in table 3 show that demography affects willingness to pay 1000 
Kroner in additional taxation. The (logistic) regression corroborates the pattern in 
table 1: Elderly are less willing than younger people to pay 1000 Kroner in higher 
taxes to finance local public services. Own age appears to be more important than 
family or household members use of services. Elderly people think that younger 
generations shoulder most of tax-bill for improving old-age care.  
 
 
5. Family altruism and actual local services 
 
The relationship between family altruism and the actual allocation of local 
government spending is analyzed using local government data. The regression 
estimates are presented in Table 4. For each of the three services we present the 
results of three regressions: a standard OLS model, a fixed-effects (FE) model which 
describes the time-series effects (in four-year intervals), and a 2SLS model where the 
age variables are instrumented due to mobility effects.  
 
  18The first element studied is the disadvantage of being part of a large cohort. This is 
the cost effect of being many. The results clearly indicate that spending per client 
tends to be reduced when relative group size increases. When the share aged 0-6 years 
old goes up by 1 %, the spending per child in child care is reduced by about 0.5-1 % 
(dependent on model specification). When the share 7-15 year of age increases, the 
school spending per child in the age group is reduced by about 0,5-1 %. When the 
share above 80 years of age increases, both old-age care and health spending are 
reduced by about 0,7-0,8 %. The estimates of the full model assume a constant parent 
population. To compare elasticities with previous studies, we exclude share of 
population with clients in the family for each spending component. The two 
elasticities for children 0-6 and 7-15 now are about -0,5, while the elasticity for 
elderly above 80 is about -0,7. The quantitative importance is quite large. In child care 
one standard deviation increase in age group 0-6 (like from average 9,2% to 10,4%) 
reduces the spending per child by about 6 %. The equivalent effect for 7-15 year old 
(from 11,8 % to 13,4 %) reduces school spending per child by about 6 %. Increased 
share of elderly by one standard deviation (from 4,4 % to 5,9 %) reduces spending for 
old-age care per person in this age group by about 20 %. Note that in the school (and 
to some extent in the old-age), the cross-sectional elasticities (OLS and 2SLS) are 
smaller than the time-series effect (FE). The long-term reduction due to a large age 
group is smaller than the short-term decrease due to an increase of the group. 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
The estimates for the disadvantage of being part of a large cohort are similar to other 
studies. Borge and Rattsø (2007) find elasticities in the order of -0.6 to -0.7 for 
Denmark. The estimated disadvantage is somewhat larger than in US (Harris et al., 
2001; Ladd and Murray, 2001) and German (Kempkes, 2007) studies using local 
government data, but less than in Poterba’s (1997) study of the US states. Also Grob 
and Walter (2005), analyzing Swiss cantons, find that educational spending per 
student decreases when the number of students increases. 
 
The second element of the analysis is generational conflict, the impact of the size of 
one age group for the services of other age groups. The results in table 4 capture 
generational conflict in the Norwegian setting. The share of elderly 67-79 years has a 
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and primary schooling (elasticity of about  -0,05 to-0,1). A large share of elderly 
people crowds out spending for the young. These estimates are not sensitive to 
exclusion of the parents-variable in the regression. The cross elasticities in table 4 are 
relatively low by international standards. We find no significant cross effects related 
to old-age care. More children do not crowd out spending for the elderly. The overall 
message is clear: the politico-economic equilibrium is dominated by the cost-effect, 
not by the numerical effect related to voting power.  
 
Studies of other countries have primarily addressed the effect of the elderly for 
schools. The many US studies focusing on generational conflict show large variation 
across studies. Poterba (1997) finds strong evidence of generational conflict using 
state level data. He estimates the elasticity of school spending with respect to the 
share of elderly to be -0.26. Harris et al. (2001) estimate elasticities of up to -0.10 
using school district data, while Ladd and Murray (2001) find no evidence of 
generational conflict using county level data. Borge and Rattsø (2007) find estimates 
in the range from -0.10 to -0.15 when elderly is measured as the share of the 
population 67 years and above. Our results regarding cross-effects are somewhat 
lower than these studies. 
 
The third element is family altruism. Our data allow for an extension of the analysis 
compared to existing studies. The question here is whether it is of any importance that 
the voters have children and/or parents in the community. The regression models in 
table 4 include indicators of family altruism as well. The OLS and 2SLS models 
suggest that share of voters with children 0-6 years have a positive effect on the 
allocation for child care services, but the fixed-effects model indicates no effect. For 
school spending, OLS and 2SLS estimation indicate that share of voters with school 
children increases the allocation for education services. For example, a one percent 
increase in share of voting population with school children produces an increase in 
school spending of 0,07-0,22 percent. More parents in the electorate increases the 
political clout of children. For old-age care, share of population with elderly parents 
have a much weaker and more unstable effect. The altruism-indicates in table 4 
display a striking correspondence to the results presented in table 2: Family altruism 
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services.  
 
The key variable of the demand model is local government revenue supplied by the 
central government. The revenue elasticties are shown in table 4. The OLS effects 
estimates are comparatively low for education, and higher for child care and old-age 
services. The fixed effects coefficients are broadly consistent with the desired 
allocations reported in table 2. For example: a one percent increase in government 
revenue per capita yields no increase in child care spending, a marginal increase in 
education outlays, while it generates an increase in old-age care spending of about 0,2 
percent.   
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
We have expanded the evidence available regarding generational conflict and 
disadvantage being part of a large cohort and have allowed for altruism effects within 
the family using a unique new dataset. The econometric analysis is based on a data 
from survey questionnaires for the period 1993-2007, and panel data set for local 
governments in Norway during the period 1992-2004. We have focused on child care, 
primary education, care for the elderly, and health services.  The empirical analyses 
have identified five major results: 
 
1.  People of all age groups want to allocate more resources to welfare services. 
Most voters want to allocate more resources to old-age care than to child care 
and school services. Even young or middle-aged voters want the higher 
spending increase to care for the elderly. 
2.  Elderly citizens cannot expect much political support from their family 
members. The young and middle aged voters prioritize child care and 
schooling for their children, not services for elderly family members. 
3.  The political equilibrium shifts as the relative size of the age groups in the 
local population change. Large cohorts receive lower per capita spending 
levels. This appears to be a robust short-term effect as well as stable, long-
term phenomenon. In the long run, the estimates suggest that a large share of 
children decreases school spending comparatively more than a large share of 
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to lower per capita spending on services for the elderly.  
4.  A larger share of elderly lowers the level of school spending and child care 
spending. Larger shares of children have no impact on the spending level for 
old-age care.  
5.  Consistent with survey the data analysis, when larger shares of the electorate 
have children, local governments allocate more resources to child care and 
schooling. Local governments allocate no additional appropriations to old-age 
care in response to larger shares of voters with elderly parents. 
 
Overall, a greyer society will not threaten day-care centers or school spending. Actual 
spending allocations predict that the upcoming increase of elderly will dilute old-age 
care. Since the elderly population cannot count on political support of younger family 
members, the old must take care of their own interests themselves. 
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  24Table 1 Local government data 
Mean and standard deviation in parenthesis, economic data in 1.000 NOK current prices 
 1992  1996  2000    2004 
          
Revenues (taxes plus block grants) per capita  17.593  19.011  24.333    29.878 
 (5.592)  (5.301)  (6.817)    (7.576) 
Net child care expenditures per person aged 0-6 years*)  14.364  24.517  30.965    44.929 
 (6.792)  (10.008)  (11.817)    (13.437) 
Net education expenditure per person aged 7-15 years**) 42.455  41.227  56.748    55.265 
 (11.367)  (10.587)  (13.150)    (11.607) 
Net old-age care expenditure per person aged 80- years 150.035  163.621  208.824    n.a. 
 (55.569)  (57.390)  (64.479)    n.a. 
Net health and social exp. per person aged 80- years  215.685  238.633  290.835    272.957 
 (81.289)  (87.477)  (94.661)    (82.421) 
Population   9734  10046  10295    10547 
 (27074)  (28478)  (29563)    (30597) 
Share 0-6 years*)  0.092  0.08  0.078    0,073 
 (0,012)  (0,011)  (0,010)    (0,010) 
Share 7-15 years**)   0,118  0,130  0.135    0,139 
 (0,016)  (0,015)  (0,014)    (0,014) 
Share 67-79 years   0,111  0.111  0.105    0,097 
 (0,024)  (0,024)  (0,022)    (0,020) 
Share 80- years   0,044  0.048  0,050    0.054 
 (0,015)  (0,016)  (0,016)    (0,016) 
Share with parents 80-years   0,015  0,040  0.048    0,060 
 (0,007)  (0,019)  (0,018)    (0,016) 
Share with children 0-6 years   0.164  0.167    0.165    0.155 
 (0,026)  (0,025)    (0,024)    (0,024) 
Share with children 7-15 years   0.195  0.196  0.195    0,248 
 (0,030)  (0,027)  (0,024)    (0,024) 
Share with higher education   0,113  0.133  0.153    0,167 
 (0,040)  (0,044)  (0,049)    (0,051) 
 (426)  (433)  (435)    (432) 
 
n.a.: Data not available 
*) 0-6 years for 1992, 0-5 years for 1996, 2000 and 2004 
**) 7-15 years for 1992, 6-15 years for 1996, 2000 and 2004 
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Table 2 Interview responses, use of service, desired service spending and tax level 
   Use of local government services  Preferred expenditure increases for   Pay higher 
taxes?  
    Child care  Schools  Old-age  Child care  Schools  Old-age   
Year  Age  groups      NOK  NOK  NOK  %  yes 
  - 49 years  19,4 %  32, 5%  1,3 %  73  165  196  69,0 % 
             
  50-66 years  1,5 %  6,7 %  5,0 %  31  81  327  51,9 % 
1993            
  67-years  0,1 %  1,3 %  4,7 %  20  51  362  30,3 % 
             
  All  12, 8%  22,6 %  2,6 %  57  131  246  60,0 % 
 (N)  (2694)  (3820) (3820)  (2808)  (2787)  (2785)  (3765) 
  - 49 years  19,0 %  32,6 %  1,5 %  81  159  304  71,1 % 
             
  50-66 years  1,7 %  6,8 %  4,1 %  35  80  500  60,0 % 
1996            
  67-years  1,5 %  2,7 %  7,4 %  17  38  376  39,1 % 
             
  All  12,8 %  22,9 %  2,9 %  62  125  428  64,4 % 
 (N)  (3833)  (3833) (3833)  (2950)  (2949)  (2946)  (3802) 
  - 49 years  20,9 %  42,2 %  17,2 %  164  254  329  61,7 % 
             
  50-66 years  22,6 %  37,5 %  28,2 %  131  228  487  59,0 % 
2007            
  67-years  18,4 %  30,7 %  27,4 %  138  228  593  42,2 % 
             
  All  20,7 %  38,5 %  18,5 %  154  245  427  58,6% 
 (N)  (3993)  (3993) (3994)  (730)  (1016)  (1441)  (2562) 
 
 
Source: Population surveys 1993 and 1996, local government election study 2007Table 3 Regression analysis of responses, desired increase in service spending and higher taxes 
OLS and logistic regression, coefficients and t-values/chi-square in parenthesis, reference groups: Year 2007, 67+ years, respondent does not use service 
  Dependent variables:
  Child care (log)  Schools (log)  Old-age care (log)  Pay higher taxes (=1)a) 
  I II I II I II  I  II 
    
Year  (1993)=1  -2.77*** -2.91 *** -2.10*** -3.01  *** -1.66*** -1.36***  0.06  0.04   
 (-26,8)  (18,6)   (20,2) (-19,6)    (21.1) (-12,8) (3,55) (0,82)   
Year(1996)=1  -2.69*** -2.73 *** 2.01*** -2.88  *** -0.79*** -0.48***  0.18***  0.17  *** 
 (26,6)  (17,5)  (20,1) (18,9)   (10,1) (4,65) (3,81) (18,5)   
- 49 years,  (=1)  1.45***  1.43***  1.36***  1.28  *** -1.60*** -1.03***  0.59  0.57  *** 
 (15,7)  (15,5)  (13,7) (12,9)   (13,2) (12,7) (233) (215)   
50-66 years,  (=1)  0.56*** 0.55*** 0.74*** 0.69  ***  -0.28** -0.27**  0.23***  0.54  *** 
  (5,67) (5,63) (7,69) (6,47)    (-3,26) (3,11)  (25,2)  (27,6)   
Use of child care (=1)  1.12***  0.35**  0.65*** 0.19    -0.32*** 0.01 0.30***  0.38  *** 
  (14,2) (2,02) (7,69) (1,11)    (-4,47) (0,08)  (21,8)  (27,6)   
Use of schooling (=1)  -0.59***  -0.22  1.01***  -0.08   -0.23***  0.09  0.10  0.10  
 (5,67)  (-1,27)  (13,9)  (-0,49)    (3,75) (0,71)  (3,19)  (2,99)   
Use of old-age care (=1)  -0.12  -0.05  -0.29*  -0.10   0.03  -0.04  0.08  -0.18  
  (0,95) (-0,29) (-2,23) (-0,60)    (0,26) (-0,04)  (0,93)  (2,46)   
                
Year(1993)* Use of child care (=1)    1.04***    0.42       -0.51**    0.20  
    (4,73)    (1,89)       (-2,81)    (3,38)  
Year(1996)* Use of child care (=1)    0.92***    0.77 ***      -0.45**      0.09  
   (4,43)    (3,67)      (2,65)      (0,90)   
Year(1993)*Use of schooling (=1)      -0.27      1.48 ***      -0.36*      0.04  
     (1,35)    (7,40)      (2,35)      (0,32)   
Year(1996)*Use of schooling (=1)      -0.57**      1.17 ***      -0.45**      -0.02  
      (-2,87)    (5,98)      (3,03)      (0,08)   
Year(1993)*Use of old-age care (=1)      -0.02      -0.04       -0.11      -0.41 * 
      (-0,07)     (-0,10)       (-0,37)      (4,98)   
Year(1996)*Use of old-age care (=1)      -0.21      -0.44       0.23      0.01   
      (-0,76)     (-1,52)      (0,97)      (0,01)   
Fixed effect for municipality Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes   
R-Square 0.28 0.29 0.26 0.27 0.20 0.20 0.09 0.13   
* < 0,05, ** <0,01, *** <0.001, N = 6213 
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Estimated coefficients, T-values in paranthesis 
  Child care per 0-6 years (log)    Education per 7-15 years (log)  Old-age care per 80- years (log)  Health/ social c. per 80-years (log) 
  OLS FE 2SLS OLS FE  2SLS    OLS FE  2SLS    OLS  FE  2SLS   
                                              
Revenes per capita (log)   0.950  ***  -0,018    0.672  *** 0,417  *** 0,090  **  0.447  ***  0,798  *** 0,211  *** 0.778  *** 0,763  *** 0,117  *** 0.719 *** 
 (17,4)    (-0,21)    (12,46)    (21,01)   (3,11)    (21,1)    (23,51)  (4,33)    (20,6)   (31,19)   (4,47)    (25,5)   
Population  (log)  -0,051 **  -0,301 * -0.095  *** -0,066 *** 0,434 *** -0.062 ***  0,035 *** -0,106   0.052  *** 0,028 *** -0,072   0.031 *** 
  (-3,61)   (-2,06)   (6,16)    (12,9)   (8,44)   (8,86)    (3,84)   (-1,14)   (4,79)    (4,41)   (-1,55)   (3,97)   
Share  0-6  years  (log)  -1,175 ***  -0,642 * -0.437  *** -0,055   -0,285 **  0.056    -0,010   -0,124   0.161  *  -0,189   0,026    0.118  ** 
  (-5,04)   (-2,82)   (5,18)    (-0,65)   (-3,55)   (-1,91)   (-0,09)   (-1,05)   (2,38)    (-1,81)   (0,36)    (2,69)   
Share  7-15  years  (log)  -0,776 **  -0,244   -0.398  **  -0,580 *** -0,971 *** -0.698  ***  -0,163   -0,052   0.082    -0,154   -0,005   -0.066  
  (-3,30)   (-1,01)   (-3,15)   (-6,78)   (8,44)   (-13,65)    (-1,14)   (-0,45)   (0,81)    (-1,46)   (-0,06)   (-1,01)   
Share  67-79  years  (log)  -0,296 **  -0,286 * -0.186  *  -0,096 **  -0,079 *  -0.005   0,166 **  0,077   -0.031   -0,014   0,032   -0.331  *** 
  (-3,52)   (-2,69)   (-2,56)   (-3,15)   (-2,11)   ('-0,20)   (3,15)   (1,31)   (-0,58)   (-0,38)   (0,96)   (8,72)   
Share  80-  years  (log)  -0,048   0,002    -0.090    -0,022   -0,062   -0.091  *  -0,709 *** -0,871 *** -0.756  *** -0,747 *** -0,881 *** -0.685 *** 
  (-0,91)   (0,24)    (0,90)    (-1,16)   (-1,94)   (-2,16)    (21,13)   (-17,9)   (-12,51)   (-31,40)   (-29,92)   (-14,3)   
Share  with  parents  80-years  (log)  -0,048   -0,001   -0.044    0,074 *** 0,047 **  0.154  ***  0,025   -0,040 *  0.170  *  -0,005   -0,029 *  0.093 * 
  (-1,83)   (-0,01)   (-0,52)   (6,99)   (3,55)   (3,97)    (1,48)   (-2,28)   (3,07)    (-0,41)   (-2,40)   (2,12)   
Share with children 0-6 years (log)  0,716  **  -0,151    1.544  *** 0,028    (0,036)   0.097    -0,064    (0,042)   -0.341  **  0,166    -0,034    -0.052  
  (3,01)   (-0,79)   (7,13)    (0,33)   (0,45)   (1,10)    (-0,43)   (0,32)   (2,70)    (1,56)    (--0,47)   (-0,47)   
Share  with  children  7-15  years  (log) -0,218   -0,181   -1,842  *** 0,071   0,218 *  0.190  *  0,119   0,011   -0.282 *  -0,160   -0,147 *  -0.641 *** 
  (0,92)   (-0,79)   (-8,41)    (0,83)   (2,68)   (2,19)    (0,43)   (0,11)   (2,01)    (-1,52)   (-2,00)   (-5,60)   
Share  with  higher  education  (log)  0,313  ***  0,173    0.306  *** -0,001   -0,120 *  0.022    -0,023   -0,203 *  -0.014    0,013    -0,194 *** 0.018  
  (8,09)   (1,21)   (8,19)   (-0,02)    (-2,37)    (0,15)   (-0,99)   (-2,80)   (-0,52)    (0,77)    (4,24)    (0,93)   
Fixed  effects  for  years  Yes    Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes    Yes  Yes   Yes    Yes  Yes    Yes   
Fixed effects for municipality  No    Yes  No    No    Yes    No    No    Yes    No    No    Yes    No   
R-Square  0.62    0.75  0.660  0.81  0.93  0.800  0.67  0.94   0,62   0.75  0.95   0,70   
* < 0,05, ** <0,01, *** <0.001 
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